Forthcoming, *International Studies Quarterly*.

Racial Discrimination in International Visa Policies

Andrew S. Rosenberg*

This Version: December 2022

Abstract: Does racial discrimination persist in global mobility rights? While many states explicitly discriminated based on race far into the 20th century, contemporary migration policy-making is now putatively objective. The rise of white supremacist violence against all varieties of migrants, politician statements, and public support for restrictive policies call this supposed color blindness into question. However, existing work is not discerning because most policies appear objective. In this article, I use new data on bilateral visa waiver policies from 1973 to 2013 to show that racial difference predicts whether a country receives a visa waiver, even after accounting for its economic, political, and security context. This conditional racial discrimination has worsened since 9/11. In so doing, I provide evidence of systematic racial discrimination in international visa policy-making. The results have important implications for the study of racial inequality in the international system.

*Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Florida. Email: andrewrosenberg@ufl.edu. Web: www.andrew-rosenberg.com. I would like to thank Hannah Alarian, David Bearce, James Fahey, Sabrina Marasa, Kelly Richarson, and Camber Warren for helpful feedback. I am also grateful to audiences and participants at the 2021 ISA Annual Conference and at the Political Behavior Lab at the University of Florida.

Introduction

Despite high profile hand-wringing over the dangers of "ridiculous open borders" (Trump 2020), policies governing global mobility remain "the last major redoubt of unfettered national sovereignty" (Martin 1989, 547). Yet, while states used to directly forbid entry from those deemed racially undesirable or dangerous, international norms now preclude explicit discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity (FitzGerald and David Cook-Martín 2014; Sassen 1996). The shift from ascriptive to "skills-based" selection remains an astounding post-War change, even as states increasingly show the will to enact restrictive migration policies (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000; Peters 2017).[1]

The contemporary politics of migration calls the reality of this color blindness into question. Many leaders and their constituents continue to clamor for more restrictive policies, and they use language that runs the gamut from thinly veiled to overtly racist when doing so (see, e.g., Hogan and Haltinner 2015). Social scientists have responded to this disconnect between theory and practice. Recent work demonstrates that modern policies reproduce the same biases that spurred on the push toward color blindness in the 1960s (Boucher 2020; Ellermann and Goenaga 2019; FitzGerald et al. 2018). Extensive critical scholarship flanks this work, unmasks the myriad contexts in which global mobility reflects long-standing biases (Valdez 2016), and often contends that states have a moral obligation to open their borders (Hayter 2000).

This scholarship generates rich accounts of how the putatively "color-blind" politics of global mobility continue to reproduce inequality. However, it suffers from a suite of limiting inferential issues. First, while many scholars and laypeople presume that racial discrimination persists in international migration, this discrimination evades systematic detection *because it is legally forbidden* and therefore *indirect*. While policies seem to have disproportionate adverse effects on protected groups, laws no longer explicitly refer to race. Rosenberg (2019) uses a latent measurement strategy to provide evidence of racial inequality in global international migration flows, but he stops short of providing a

[1] See FitzGerald and David Cook-Martín (2014), Joppke (2005), and Triadafilopoulos (2010) for different explanations for the demise of overtly racist immigration policies.

clear mechanism linking policy to inequality. Second, despite recent advances in the scope and quality of migration-related data, the policies governing global mobility remain color-blind and most no longer target specific states (Bearce and Hart 2017, 5). Because leaders rarely admit to discriminatory intentions, they can always point to mitigating factors for observed inequalities. Finally, extant qualitative work tends to focus on a select group of cases, which is a form of selection bias. Highlighting how certain policies—such as Germany's language requirement—discriminate against non-White migrants is powerful because it provides corroborating evidence (Ellermann and Goenaga 2019). But examining specific cases because they conform to the logic of one's theory prevents one from making claims about what produces those policies in the first place.

In this article, I build on Rosenberg (2019)'s work and provide evidence of racial discrimination in international mobility. This evidence corroborates a growing body of scholarship in IR that considers how race and racism continue to structure the international system (e.g., Búzás 2021; Shilliam 2018). To do so, I use an approach that takes each of the aforementioned inferential hurdles into consideration. I study a particular type of policy-making that is ideal for inferring discrimination: bilateral visa waivers. When a country grants another country a visa waiver, it allows citizens from that county entry for a specific period of time without a visa. Visa controls are the "first line of defense" against unwanted migrants (Torpey 1998, 252) because they affect one's ability to enter a state for travel, to make asylum claims, and to make other connections that often lead to more permanent status. As such, studying visa waivers provides insight into global mobility privilege. Moreover, states grant visa waivers on a state-by-state basis, which grants a unique opportunity to discern how states perceive other states. I a use this new database on bilateral visa policies to show that racial difference predicts whether a country receives a visa waiver (Czaika, Haas, and Villares-Varela 2018), even after accounting for its economic, political, and security context, and this association has strengthened in the 21st century. These patterns provide evidence of conditional racial discrimination in international visa policy.

This article proceeds in five parts. First, I outline how the shift from explicitly racist to "color-blind" migration policy-making obscures modern, indirect discrimination. Second, I describe bilat-

eral visa waivers, where they fit into a state's migration policy-making repertoire, and why they allow one to test for the presence of indirect racial discrimination. Third, I lay out an argument for how such discrimination persists in global mobility. Fourth, I define race, racism, and racial discrimination and how these definitions permit empirical study. Fifth, I test these theoretical propositions. The final section discusses these findings and concludes.

Direct and Indirect Discrimination in Immigration Policy-Making

Despite the end of explicitly racist migration policies, evidence shows that states continue to select temporary and permanent migrants on the basis of ascriptive characteristics (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013). This selection reproduces the same racial inequalities as the supposedly bygone era. The inferential problem is that examples of leaders declaring their intentions to racially discriminate against migrants are few and far between. Although some leaders still use racist language to deride migrants (Hogan and Haltinner 2015), most proclaim that their policies are "non-discriminatory" (Dernbach and Starzmann 2018). This juxtaposition between rhetoric and reality makes it difficult to identify contemporary discrimination because explicitly discriminatory laws clearly denote where prejudice exists.

In other words, the difference between previous eras and today is that policies no longer permit the direct discrimination of groups; it is now *indirect*. Direct discrimination refers to deliberate prejudice on the basis of any protected class, and it is therefore easy to measure. Conversely, indirect discrimination refers to rules that appear neutral on their face, but still have disproportionate adverse effects on protected groups. The European Union provides the clearest definition:

> Indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appro-

priate and necessary.[2]

Anti-indirect discrimination provisions apply throughout the global North (Collins and Khaitan 2018, 2). Scholars who investigate how language tests disproportionately affect non-White migrants study indirect discrimination.

However, indirect discrimination is hard to measure. Observe that the EU forbids indirect discrimination unless it is "objectively justified by a legitimate aim." This clause gives policymakers wide latitude, which is reflected in justifications of migration restrictions on national security grounds. As such, stating that a given policy indirectly discriminates does not avoid the epistemic problem of overcoming these arguments about legitimate aims. This linguistic resource ensures that the debate will always resemble a back-and-forth over whether the provisions of some law are really discriminatory or instead reflect a reasonable exercise of sovereign power that promotes national solidarity and ensures that objectively undesirable persons do not enter.

In response, I distinguish between unconditional and conditional indirect discrimination. Many arguments about indirect discrimination implicitly refer to *unconditional* discrimination, which occurs when the burden of a policy falls disproportionately on protected groups. For example, stating that nationals of non-White states have far fewer opportunities for visa-free travel is a claim about unconditional indirect discrimination. This claim is unconditional because it does not take context or confounding into consideration, and these arguments typically rely on raw distributions of outcomes across groups as evidence. Such arguments can succumb to counterarguments that policies are not really discriminatory because some reasonable mitigating factor explains the disparity. In contrast, *conditional* indirect discrimination occurs when disparities persist even after accounting for potentially confounding characteristics. These claims embrace mitigating factors. Rather than merely looking at raw distributions of outcomes, identifying conditional indirect discrimination requires one to control for important variables that are correlated with both one's status in a protected

[2]Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22, Art 2.2 (b).

group and the outcome.

Distinguishing these two types of claims provides a strategy forward for investigating racial discrimination in global mobility. Claims about conditional indirect discrimination are more tractable because they require one to specify the "justifiable" reasons to treat groups differently. These inferences are easier to warrant in a world in which explicit racism is more socially undesirable because they neither require one to infer overtly discriminatory intentions nor rely on unconditional descriptive statistics.[3] They are also more transparent because they require one to enumerate a list of mitigating variables. If inequality remains after accounting for these factors, then one can more strongly assert that discrimination occurs.

Rather than agnostically exposing racial inequality in international migration flows (Rosenberg 2019), I explore conditional indirect discrimination in bilateral visa policy-making and directly test hypotheses linking racial difference to inequality. This investigation reveals a particular mechanism through which states reproduce such inequality.

Visa Waivers and the Global Mobility Divide

Visa policy is an internationally accepted mechanism that differentiates between potential travelers based on their nationality. As such, visa policies are the primary instrument states use to assert sovereignty over their borders because visas control the exact foreigners that may enter. Prospective travelers typically apply for a visa in their home country. When they apply, the prospective traveler must provide personal information and occasionally biometric data. Visa applications are often expensive and confusing, and many countries require some portion of the application process to take place at a consulate, further exacerbating the cost.

[3]Indirect discrimination is agnostic about intentionality. It is impossible to discern intentions from policies, and policymakers might intentionally or unintentionally discriminate on the basis of race with indirect policies. In other words, indirect discrimination might be unintentional but it need not be; it can also be very intentional.

These points of friction are deliberate; destination countries use visa policies to simultaneously select wanted travelers and keep away unwanted border-crossers (Guiraudon 2003; Shachar 2018). One way that states do so is by waiving the visa requirement for travelers from certain countries. These privileged travelers may enter enter for a fixed period of time without a visa. As such, visa waivers epitomize the fundamental paradox of modern global mobility: States feel compelled to both prevent "undesirable" migration and encourage "desirable" cross-border flows. Bilateral visa waivers serve this function because they allow states to evaluate every other state in the world to determine whether their citizens can enter without a visa.



Figure 1: The growth of visa waivers from the 1970s to 2013.

Visa waivers are a new phenomenon. Until the end of the 20th century, almost all travelers needed to apply for a visa to enter another country. As international travel ticked up during the 1980s and 1990s, states began creating visa waiver programs to avoid spending valuable time processing applications for travelers from "safe" countries. Figure 1 provides descriptive support for this trend. It shows that global number of visa waivers was relatively small during the 1970s and 1980s before

rising substantially during the 1990s and 2000s.

The process of granting a visa waiver varies, but it typically involves executive consultation regarding a country's fitness for a waiver. In the the United States, a broad visa requirement applied to all travelers, other than citizens from Canada and the British Overseas Territories of Bermuda until the mid-1980s (Mau et al. 2012, 58–59). In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which created the Visa Waiver Program. Now, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, uses Immigration and Naturalization Service and Department of Homeland Security reports on a prospective country's political, economic, social, and security conditions to determine whether it should receive a visa waiver. In the European Union, a joint European Parliament and Council regulation harmonizes the list of third-country nationals that require a visa (Regulation (EU) 2018/1806), and the Council has the authority to grant or repeal a given state's waiver.[4]

Figure 2 presents the distribution of visa waivers by granting and receiving country in 2013. While the top panel shows significant diversity in the countries that grant the most waivers, the bottom panel reveals that rich countries in the global North receive the most waivers. In other words, all countries retain the capacity to judge other countries' fitness for a waiver, and those perceptions privilege the global North.

To be sure, visa waivers regulate international mobility, not international migration; visa-free travel does not entitle someone the right to migrate from the target state to the sending state on a permanent basis. Yet, visa waivers are possibly the most influential instruments of migration policy because most international mobility is temporary. The roughly 2.4 billion international tourist arrivals in 2019 dwarf the 280.6 million global migrants (The World Bank 2022). Moreover, temporary travel often becomes permanent.[5] Visa waivers allow one to temporarily enter a state and can make it easier to claim asylum or make connections that could lead to more permanent status. This re-

[4]See, e.g., the Council's ruling on the partial suspension of Vanuatu: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6190-2022-INIT/en/pdf.

[5]I thank an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this added importance of visa waivers.



Figure 2: Which countries grant and receive the most visa waivers, 2013?

lationship between visa waiver-led, temporary mobility and permanent migration typically focuses on the effect of tourism, and it is called the tourism-led migration hypothesis (TLM) (Williams and Hall 2002). Significant empirical evidence supports the TLM (Seetaram 2012), and recent quantitative studies show that it holds cross-nationally in the European Union (Provenzano 2020). As a result, visa waivers play an important role in the politics of international migration because they not only affect temporary flows of people, they also catalyze the permanent flows that cause public debate.

Finally, visa waivers are unique in the modern international system because states use them to explicitly treat countries differently from one another. Most modern immigration policies are coarse instruments. States can change the strictness of their admissions criteria, adjust their immigrant or refugee cap, or construct a border fence. In these cases, states may intend to restrict immigration from those they deem undesirable, but policies cannot restrict or promote immigration from a specific racial group. This policy coarseness represents the most jarring shift from the colonial to the postcolonial international system. When explicit racism lost its social desirability and states began

adopting "color-blind" immigration policies, they lost the ability to overtly select immigrants from specific groups and scholars lost the ability to infer discrimination. Visa waivers are the only example of a migration policy that states use to legitimately and overtly discriminate against another state's nationals, which makes them well-suited for inferring contemporary, "color blind" racial discrimination.

How Racial Discrimination Persists in Visa Policy

This discussion shows that nation-states are allowed to discriminate against foreign citizens on the basis of nationality when they decide whether to grant visa waivers. But I argue that this discrimination reflects a *racial* discrimination that goes beyond benign, "rational" selection. While the latter evinces the realities of an international system in which sovereign states seek to balance maintaining national solidarity and maximizing the benefits of migration, the former intimates that states limit racially different migrants above and beyond the simple tenets of sovereignty and economic rationality. However, the two are connected.

So, how does racism generate this racial discrimination? Is it due to implicit or explicit biases in political officials who determine these waivers? Or does racial discrimination emerge as a by-product of electoral incentives and bureaucratic priorities? The problem with this question is that both possibilities explain discrimination and they are observationally equivalent. Policymakers restrict visa waivers based on race either because they hold discriminatory views or they want to appease their constituents. One can trace this explanation to the institution of sovereignty. The right to border control defines sovereign statehood, and courts and politicians throughout the world have long expressed this sentiment (Martin and Ferris 2017) because the idea of sovereignty depends on discrete political communities.

As a result, state sovereignty leads to particularistic nation-states in at least two ways. First, states' national identities are constructed through maintaining an inside/outside distinction (Campbell 1992, 73–75). Representations of the "other" are central to this process (Doty 1996), which leads citizens to assign different levels of moral worth to fellow citizens and foreigners. Second, the produc-

tion of national identity ensures that a state's physical territory is loaded with "emotional meanings related to personal continuity and to which we are attached" (Mitzen 2018, 1374). Ideas of "home" and "homeland" emerge out of these emotional meanings, on which politicians often draw to mobilize constituents because of their importance to national identity-construction.[6]

The use of the outsider to construct the national identity and the emotional salience of the homeland ensure that sovereign statehood, restrictive immigration policies, and an anti-migrant disposition are symbiotic. Sovereignty generates the desire to restrict outsiders from the homeland and the act of restricting outsiders reinforces nationhood. Put another way, the fact that the international system is composed of sovereign states ensures that leaders and citizens of those states will see foreigners as outsiders, threats, and/or undeserving of membership in their political community. As a result, the general public does not support large-scale permanent immigration in most of the world's countries because they see immigrants as a threat or a burden to the nation (Kymlicka and Banting 2006). Communitarian defenses of closed borders and strict immigration policies reflect these beliefs.[7] But even staunch communitarians recognize justice obligations for certain migrants (Ypi 2008, 397). These demands reflect economic self-interest or extreme circumstances (i.e. refugees fleeing political violence). As such, separating "desirable" from "undesirable" outsiders remains an important task.

Therefore, sovereign responsibility explains the persistence of both unconditional and conditional racial discrimination. Regardless of whether elites hold overtly racist views, they all are subject to this conventional wisdom about sovereignty.[8] As a consequence, imposing restrictive visa require-

[6]This aspect of identity formation draws on ontological security, which is "the need to experience oneself as a whole, continuous person in time—as being rather than constantly changing—in order to realize a sense of agency" (Mitzen 2006, 342).

[7]See Bader (2005, 344–352) for an overview of the philosophical defense of closed borders.

[8]To be sure gross racial biases may drive national security concerns too. Some scholars have made this argument regarding President Trump's "Muslim ban" (Yousuf and Calafell 2018, 312–313). Even

ments or removing visa waivers for certain nationalities will present themselves as natural solutions for appeasing a population that is hostile to immigration (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015). Yet, the two types of indirect discrimination are generated in slightly different ways, and dissecting unconditional from conditional racial discrimination is an important task because doing so allows one to identify the discrimination that remains after accounting for the "rational" dictates of sovereignty.

On the one hand, countries do not want to admit short-term travelers that are likely to overstay their visa or commit crimes, which leads them to create standards for receiving a waiver that are supposedly correlated with these outcomes and that disproportionately affect non-White states. These standards of "objective" undesirability correlate with race because much of the global South experienced the effects of Western imperialism and neo-imperialism that created these conditions. Anglo-European imperialism and legal White supremacy created the "undesirable" non-White migrants that these states now objectively restrict. This argument accords with existing work that shows that international visa policies directly discriminate against poor countries in the global South (Haas, Natter, and Vezzoli 2018; Mau et al. 2015; Neumayer 2006).[9] These policies create indirect racial discrimination because the global income distribution is correlated with race. Therefore, these "rational" bureaucratic priorities create unconditional racial discrimination that resembles an international institutional racism.

On the other hand, this unconditional indirect discrimination does not capture the complete picture. To be sure, imperialism created the material conditions that policymakers now use to justify withholding waivers. However, if this was the only mechanism generating racial inequality, then the European Union would grant a visa waiver to India, for example, because it is a democracy that

---

in these cases, however, states do not express explicitly racist motivations. One cannot pin down racist intentions, so the analysis below exposes patterns of discrimination that reveal the structural nature of international racial inequality.

[9] "Chances are high if you are an affluent country and you are also a democracy" (Mau et al. 2012, 62).

has experience tremendous economic growth. But *perceptions* of undesirability are racialized and do not track reality. The global North often refers to cultural and social practices to deem non-White states undesirable regardless of actual material conditions (Chung 2020, 2499), and these racialized perceptions apply to visa waiver policies. Selection by putatively objective conditions like wealth and regime type is "a precautionary measure against the *alleged or expected* abuse of visas" (Mau et al. 2012, 73, emphasis mine). And this expansive mandate to prevent "alleged or expected" abuses leads states to use imperfect heuristics to withold waivers. Racial inequality emerges not only when states grant waivers on the basis of factors that correlate with race and histories of imperialism, but also when their perceptions lead them to treat non-White countries differently *even after accounting for those factors*. Moreover, racist politicians still exist, and so do citizens that want explicit race-based restrictions. This explicit racism combines with others who hold implicitly racist perceptions of the global South that unintentionally produce the same "color-blind" racism on offer in the post-1960s United States (Bonilla-Silva 2006). This is conditional indirect racial discrimination.

Still, countries may enact visa waiver policies to satisfy the supranational nature of its national identity rather than to promote racial bias. For example, Poland refuses to accept non-European refugees, and a skeptic could argue that its visa waiver policy may not be racist and instead reflects bonds of identity with other countries, such as Ukraine during the 2022 Russian invasion. This counterclaim emphasizes the distinction and relationship between national identity and racial discrimination. To be sure, national identification can lead states to enact visa policies that reflect perceptions of "we-ness" with other states. However, such policies create a form of positive selection that leads to indirect racial bias in the absence of directly discriminatory intent. In fact, Ellermann and Goenaga (2019) argue that positive discrimination is one of the three main mechanisms that contribute to discrimination in liberal states' immigration policies. It is difficult to measure such dyadic bonds of identity. Nevertheless, the existence of positive selection on national identity grounds does not preclude the identification of conditional racial discrimination.[10]

[10]In fact, the omission of a dyadic shared national identity measure makes the analysis of conditional racial discrimination below more conservative. If countries that share bonds of national

Both mechanisms rely on perceptions of inferiority and undesirability that stem from the long-running unequal exploitation of the South by the North. Recent evidence shows that these sentiments have deepened in the post-9/11 world (Coleman and Kocher 2011), as states have become increasingly sensitive to perceived threats from supposedly dangerous migrants (Bourbeau 2011, 106–109). Therefore, as global migration and anti-immigration sentiment increase throughout both the North and South (Cogley, Doces, and Whitaker 2018), politicians have the incentive to lean into their sovereign duty to impose visa waiver restrictions against those nationalities that are the most obviously "dangerous" or "undesirable." Policymakers' statements reveal these incentives (Mau et al. 2012, 62).



Figure 3: The distribution of visa waivers granted by the OECD over time.

This richer conception of how discrimination occurs reveals the problem with using existing evidence to claim that racial discrimination persists in visa policy-making. Extant studies show a global mobility divide between the global North and South (Mau et al. 2015), which provides evidence

identity are less racially distant (negative correlation between omitted variable and X), and if shared national identity is positively correlated with receiving a visa waiver (positive correlation between X and Y), then the estimated effect of racial difference on the likelihood of receiving a visa waiver is actually too small.

for unconditional racial discrimination. This evidence often resembles that in figure 3, which presents a descriptive racial hierarchy in the countries to which the OECD grants visa waivers. Notice that OECD countries, all rich and mostly raced as "White," grant the most visa waivers to fellow members of the global North and the least to those raced as "non-White": countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia.

However, unconditional analyses do not account for the other, non-prejudiced reasons why a state may refuse to grant another state a visa waiver. A skeptic may always respond that patterns of inequality are benign because they merely fall along "rational" lines. As a result, these studies are blind to the conditional racial discrimination that can persist even after accounting for factors like economic development that reflect racialized perceptions. A better test would investigate conditional discrimination directly and examine whether racial perceptions predict the absence of a visa waiver after accounting for the observable characteristics that states use to grant visa waivers. This analysis will 1) guard against the critique that unconditional patterns of inequality are incidental artifacts of rational selection; 2) provide a more conservative test—unconditional patterns of inequality may vanish after one controls for observables; and 3) provide direct evidence of racial discrimination.

Hypotheses

I conduct such an analysis to test three hypotheses. First, conditional racial discrimination suggests that, all else equal, one treats racially distant actors differently than racially similar actors. If, given two otherwise identical states, a state only grants the racially similar one a visa waiver, then we say that it conditionally discriminated against the latter. So, the probability of a destination requiring a visa for nationals from a target state increases (decreases) as the racial distance between the two states increases (decreases), conditional on other variables that affect the likelihood of receiving a visa waiver. Second, as a corollary, this conditional indirect discrimination should be strongest between destination countries in the global North and target countries in the global South. *Racial* discrimination implies that White countries are more likely to conditionally discriminate against non-White countries. While imperfect, the global North-South distinction is one way of dividing the world

along the global color line to test whether conditional racial discrimination continues to reproduce the global racial hierarchy.

Third, the relationship in Hypothesis 1 should strengthen since the 1990s and accelerate after turn of the 21st century. When states required all travelers to have a visa, there was no relationship between racial perceptions and the likelihood of receiving a visa waiver: All travelers from all states needed a visa, with some very minor exceptions. During this period, visa policies were a foreign policy tool that regulated the access of foreign nationals (Mau et al. 2012, 63), and Cold War considerations affected the relationship between the global South and North. While racial discrimination did not occur in bilateral visa waivers, it did occur in the case-by-case visa application process.

However, both traditional immigrant-receiving and immigrant-sending states began receiving an influx of immigrants and travelers from the global South. For the former, the removal of racist immigration policies severed the explicit relationship between racial difference and migration, and non-White immigration to the West began to increase. As I note above, the United States responded to this influx by creating the Visa Waiver Program to focus the State Department's resources on preventing "undesirable" inflows. For the latter, the 1970s and 1980s saw an increase in labor migration, and the fall of the Iron Curtain created fears of immigration and asylum-seekers (64–65). Individual states and the European Union restricted their policies to combat this supposed threat.

Therefore, the association between racial distance and visa requirements should be ambiguous until the 1990s because visa requirements were ubiquitous, but it should emerge and strengthen as more states began to use waivers to restrict undesirable migration and positively select travelers. Moreover, this relationship should sharpen after 9/11 because Western states have increasingly securitized non-White migrants as potential security threats after terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, and London. This securitization is reflected in visa waiver policies throughout the North; the United State and European Union increasingly consider potential security threats when granting or rescinding a waiver (86).

As a result of this process, racial inequality in movement is likely greater in the contemporary international system than it was in the past, even though absolute levels of explicit racism in West-

ern societies was higher during the 1970s and 1980s. Today, racial discrimination occurs both in individual visa applications and in bilateral visa waivers (Satzewich 2014), while previously it only occurred in the former. Once a majority of states began granting visa waivers to "trusted" countries, discrimination began to emerge through the racialized differentiation between the global North and South.

Defining Race

So far, I have broadly alluded to racial discrimination in international mobility rights. However, referring to racial discrimination in visa policy-making raises the complex question of what I mean by race.

This task requires distinguishing races from ethnicities, but the concepts are related. On the one hand, ethnicities are self-defining. Ethnic groups hold collective beliefs about their members' common descent, and these beliefs are related to shared historical experiences, cultural practices, and geography (Cornell and Hartmann 2006, 16–17). On the other hand, races are other-defining. Races are groups defined by others on the basis of perceived common physical or social markers that are held to be inherent, but have no scientific basis (22). Race is a social construction: Human beings both create racial categories and determine the markers that define those categories.

Races and ethnicities are linked because the former are often defined with reference to the latter's characteristics. Therefore, this definition is indebted to Alain Locke's ontology of race, which holds that races are "ethnic fictions."[11] Locke argues that races are sociological, rather than biological, facts (Henderson 2017, 503–504). Ethnic groups are associated with certain cultural traits and geographic areas, which have "social and historical causes" (Locke 1924, 192), and race manifests as a "selective preference for certain culture-traits and resistance to certain others" (195). In other words, races have no biological basis because they are just labels imposed on people from the same geographic area on the basis of favorable or unfavorable perceptions of their traits.

[11] See, Henderson (2017) for more detail on Locke's contributions to IR scholarship.

This definition reveals race's horizontal and vertical components. The construction of races requires perceptions of difference. Racial groups are defined by their appearances and practices, and people categorize others as racially different on the bases of these perceptions. Such perceptions of difference define race's horizontal dimension because anyone can hold racial perceptions about anyone else. While such perceptions of difference are necessary for the construction of race, this construction becomes insidious when it takes on its vertical dimension. The vertical dimension involves those in the privileged (White) racial category using these perceptions to construct those in the non-White racial categories as both distinct and deviant relative to Whites. This construction creates a racial hierarchy that, for example, White Europeans used to justify slavery and imperialism (Barder 2021, Ch. 2).

Given these definitions, the racial discrimination in bilateral visa policies that I hypothesize above occurs along both dimensions. On the horizontal dimension, I expect that states will be more reticent to grant visa waivers to those they perceive as racially different because perceptions of difference affect perceptions of visa waiver deservingness. Regardless of their place in the racial hierarchy and their domestic racial categories, states should grant waivers to those that are racially similar. On the vertical dimension, states will be reticent to grant visas waivers to non-White states because the latter are constructed as racially inferior on the basis of their perceived violence, poverty, and other supposedly undesirable qualities. In this case, states use other states' absolute position in the international racial hierarchy to grant waivers because those positions convey a state's desirability vis-à-vis norms of global White supremacy.

Research Design

I use a directed-dyadic panel analysis to model the probability that destination state A sends a visa waiver to the nationals from target state B. The dependent variable in this analysis is a binary measure of whether country A grants B a waiver. The effect of perceived racial differences on the likelihood that a target state receives a visa waiver is the main relationship of interest.

I use ordinary least squares to estimate these models and cluster standard errors at the dyad level.[12] In addition, the use of high-dimensional fixed-effects has been the most important recent innovation in directed-dyadic modelling. Carter and Poast (2020) and Gowa and Hicks (2013) have applied this approach in political science, and I implement this strategy below. In the first and second models, I estimate target (the waiver recipient) and destination-year fixed effects. The former measure any time-invariant features of target states and the latter measure any time-varying destination-level factors that affect a country's propensity to send visa waivers. This model allows me to include time-varying aspects of target states and dyadic variables that affect the propensity for state A to grant target state B a visa waiver, particularly the effect of racial difference. This strategy has the advantage of controlling for destination and target country factors that are hard to measure and may confound the effect of the dyadic variable of interest. In the third model, I exclude control target fixed effects because the main causal variable does not vary within target states.

Main Variable Definitions

I rely on the new Determinants of International Migration (DEMIG) Visa database compiled by the International Migration Institute (DEMIG 2020). These data include visa requirements for 214 countries regarding travelers from 237 countries from 1973 to 2013. To compile these data, the DEMIG project sourced the International Air Travel Association's (IATA) Travel Information Manuals (TIM). IATA releases TIMs every month to ensure that airlines and other aviation authorities possess the most up-to-date information on document requirements (Czaika, Haas, and Villares-Varela 2018, 599). The DEMIG Visa database dominates earlier uses of the TIMs because it includes data on every country in the world for forty consecutive years (c.f. Mau et al. 2015; Neumayer 2006). The database records the nationality of travelers who are exempt from a visa for every country in the world. This measure is *directed*, which means that the France $\rightarrow$ USA and USA $\rightarrow$ France dyads appear separately.

[12] I also use logistic regression to replicate this analysis and the results are consistent. This analysis is found in Appendix table S8.

For every directed destination-target dyad C_{ij}, the database records a 1 if i grants j's nationals a visa waiver and a 0 if it always requires a visa.

I use three variables to measure the perceived racial difference between states. The first captures the horizontal dimension while the second and third capture the vertical dimension. The first index measures the plurality ancestral distance between states. In technical terms, plurality ancestral distance measures the distance between two states based on how long since their largest groups have shared a common ancestor (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2018, 750). It is a "molecular clock" that captures differences in beliefs, traits, habits, and cultures (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009), rather than any phenotypic marker of race, because only 0.01% of the body's 35,000 genes manifest in appearance (Bamshad et al. 2004). I use the plurality distance because I assume that countries at a greater ancestral distance are likely to perceive each other as racially different, but the most salient form of distance is between the countries' largest groups.

The theoretical minimum of ancestral distance implies that the population distribution is identical across the two states' plurality groups, while the maximum implies that all individuals in each state's plurality group have the same ancestry and that these ancestries are dramatically different. However, this measure does not map onto conventional racial categories like "White" and "Black" because different countries have different racial ontologies. Instead, ancestral distance is a horizontal measure that stipulates that all countries will perceive other countries to be racially similar or distant, regardless of their domestic racial categories. Table 1 provides a simple example of the plurality ancestral distances between the United States and Albania, Israel, Japan and Zimbabwe. Observe that the distance between the U.S. and Zimbabwe is quite close to the distance between the U.S. and Japan because the the U.S. perceives both Zimbabwe and Japan to be racially different, despite important differences between anti-Black and anti-Asian racism.

Using a variable that connotes a biological definition—despite not denoting one—risks essentializing race. To be clear, none of these are measure of race *per se*; no one can measure race because it is not a scientific concept. The ancestral distance measures merely stipulate that populations at a greater ancestral distance from each other had more time to diverge in terms of intergenerationally

transmitted cultural traits. But differences in these traits constitute racial differences, as well as *perceptions* of racial differences. As such, this measure is consistent with Locke's conception of race as an ethnic fiction because it measures differences in cultural practices, structured along geographic lines, that outsiders construct as racial. These traits are precisely what Locke posits are correlated with geography and are constructed unfavorably by dominant racial groups. Indeed, ancestral distance correlates with varieties of cultural distance that play a role—but are not reducible to—racial categories. Of course racial differences do not reduce to cultural or ancestral distances because race has no objective basis. While ancestral distance provides a good approximation for bilateral perceptions of difference, it is not a panacea, nor should it be one.

Table 1: Plurality ancestral distance between the United States, Albania, Japan, and Zimbabwe.

State A	State B	Distance
USA	Albania	0.60
USA	Israel	10.50
USA	Japan	43.15
USA	Zimbabwe	51.45

However, the ancestral distance measure addresses only the horizontal dimension of race because it allows all states in the international system to hold racial perceptions about all other states. But the vertical component is equally important to global White supremacy. But the measure's symmetry misses the fact that those constructed as White lie on the top of the global racial hierarchy.[13] As a remedy, I use two additional measures of racial difference in this analysis. First, I include an indicator for whether the target country is a non-White state the global South. This variable will measure the existence of a general global color line in visa waiver policy. Second, I use the plurality ancestral distance between countries *relative to the United States*. Define A_{ij}^{D} as the absolute plurality distance between countries i and j and A_{ij}^{R} as the distance between i and j relative to the United States. Therefore, $A_{ij}^{R} = A_{i,US}^{D} - A_{j,US}^{D}$ (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009, 490). Countries whose plurality groups are equally close to the United States should perceive the other as racially similar.

[13] An anonymous reviewer raised this important point about the ancestral distance measure.

Other Variable Definitions

I draw on Neumayer (2006) 's existing work to include eight additional dyad-level covariates and seven additional country-level covariates. The purpose of these variables is to control for other "objective" factors that affect whether a given country grants or receives a visa waiver. The first variable is a measure of dyadic income inequality. This measure is the ratio of the per-capita GDP of the richer state over of the per-capita GDP of the poorer state: $\text{Inequality}_{ij} = \frac{max(GDP_i, GDP_j)}{min(GDP_i, GDP_j)}$. I adopt this measure from Carter and Poast (2020, 13), and I expect that the likelihood of country i allowing nationals from country j to enter without a visa will decrease as the inequality between them increases due to the aforementioned "global mobility divide" that corresponds with economic development (Mau et al. 2015, 1202). Second, I control for whether the two states were ever in a colonial relationship. Colonial legacies drive migration policies, particularly between Europe and the global South, which makes these relationships a rational determinant of visa policy. Third, I include Comtrade's measure of the logged bilateral trade flows between the states. I expect that states with strong, interdependent economic ties will be more likely to allow each others' national to enter without a visa because of preexisting norms of cooperation. Fourth, I control for whether the two states are in a a defensive alliance (Gowa 1994). Alliance relationships mollify security concerns and should increase the likelihood of a visa waiver. Next, I include three additional measures that capture how "close" two states are to each other: indicators for common language and whether the states are in the same World Bank region and in the same World Bank income group. Finally, I control for dyadic religious proximity. This measure is bounded between 0 and 1, and it is maximum when the dyad has a religion that is both ubiquitous and shared between the two states (Disdier and Mayer 2007).

The country-level covariates control for target-country factors that affect the propensity of states to send and receive visa waivers. First, I include the liberal democracy measure from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data-set (Coppedge et al. 2019). Liberal democracies are less likely to enact restrictive immigration policies (Hollifield 2004), and I expect that states view liberal democracies as more stable, desirable, and worthy of a visa waiver. Second, I control for the target state's level of

education because states with more educated citizens will appear more desirable because education and perceived desirability are highly correlated. This variable measures the average number years of education for citizens greater than 15 years old (Barro and Lee 2013). Third, I control for the level of physical violence in a state's territory. This variable also comes from V-Dem and it measures the extent to which citizens are free from physical violence. States with high levels of physical violence should be less likely to send and receive visa waivers. Violence makes countries less willing to accept outsiders, even on a temporary basis, and it also makes nationals appear dangerous and undesirable (Rudolph 2003). Fourth, I include an indicator for whether the target state experienced a terrorist attack in a given year because preventing terrorist infiltration is a stated goal of visa and migration policy This measure is from the Global Terrorism Database (START 2019). Fifth, I control for the target state's international outbound tourist receipts as a percentage of its exports to account for the attractiveness of countries that "export" tourists abroad (The World Bank 2021). Sixth, I include the V-Dem Civil Liberties Index to account for restrictions to political freedom in the target state that may negatively affect its likelihood of accepting a visa waiver. As an ensemble, these dyad- and country-level covariates account for the suite of "rational" factors that should determine whether a destination grants a target a visa waiver. Finally, I account for whether the target state maintains prohibitions on travel because states that restrict emigration are unlikely to sign visa waivers.[14]

Results

I begin by assessing the effect of three forms of racial difference on receiving a visa waiver using two different modeling strategies. In table 2, I use the same high-dimensional fixed-effects strategy as Carter and Poast (2020). In table 3, I include fixed-effects for both target and destination state, as well as a time cubic polynomial to model temporal dependence (Carter and Signorino 2010).[15] Because I

[14] I appreciate an anonymous reviewer for bringing this unmeasured confounder to my attention.

[15] The results are also robust to a reduced model with origin-year and destination-year fixed effects (see appendix table S3).

Table 2: Ancestral Distance and Bilateral Visa Waivers, 1974–2013

	Visa Waiver		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ancestral Dist.	-0.087^{***}		
	(0.016)		
Ancestral Dist. from USA		-0.031^{***}	
		(0.009)	
Origin South			-0.089^{***}
			(0.012)
Common Lang.	0.113^{***}	0.122^{***}	0.118^{***}
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Common Religion	0.093^{***}	0.092^{***}	0.092^{***}
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Inequality	-0.154^{***}	-0.166^{***}	-0.116^{***}
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Same Region	0.033^{**}	0.055^{***}	0.086^{***}
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Same Income	0.067^{***}	0.063^{***}	0.088^{***}
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Log Trade	0.130^{***}	0.138^{***}	0.133^{***}
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Colonial Relationship	-0.076^{*}	-0.073^{*}	-0.084^{*}
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Alliance	0.164^{***}	0.159^{***}	0.167^{***}
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Physical Violence Origin	-0.083^{**}	-0.086^{**}	0.055^{**}
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.025)
Education Origin	-0.046	-0.043	-0.020
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.015)
Terrorist Attack Origin	-0.010^{***}	-0.010^{***}	-0.038^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Log Tourism/Exports	0.018	0.018	-0.017^{**}
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.008)
Civil Liberties Origin	0.086	0.088	-0.042
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.034)
Lib. Democracy Origin	-0.0001	-0.001	0.199^{***}
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.019)
Exit Restrict. Origin	0.021^{**}	0.021^{**}	0.006
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Target FE	✓	✓	X
Destination-Year FE	✓	✓	✓
N	111,254	111,254	111,254
R^2	0.522	0.520	0.484
Adjusted R^2	0.509	0.507	0.471
Residual Std. Error	0.323 (df = 108351)	0.324 (df = 108351)	0.336 (df = 108476)

$^{*}p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$

cannot include destination-year fixed effects in table 3, I also include time-varying destination controls. While table 2 provides all parameter estimates, the remaining tables only present the primary coefficient estimates.[16] I only report these estimates because presenting both the main effect of interest and the confounder effects can lead to interpretive errors such as confusing direct-effect estimates with total-effect estimates for the counfounding variables (Westreich and Greenland 2013, 292).[17] I also standardize all independent variables by subtracting out the mean and dividing by two standard deviations, so the coefficient represents the effect of increasing ancestral distance from one standard deviation below to above the mean.

Model (1) in table 2 and table 3 indicates that changing ancestral distance from one standard deviation below to above the mean is associated with over an 8% decrease in the probability that the destination state will grant the target state a visa waiver.[18] This value is substantively significant because it is equivalent to roughly 38% of the baseline probability of receiving a visa waiver. Put another way, this shift in the independent variable is equivalent to a change from the plurality ancestral distance between China and Thailand (~ -0.56, standardized) to the distance between Iran and Paraguay (~ 0.46, standardized). Recall that this model controls for other factors that may affect both perceptions of racial difference and the likelihood of a visa waiver such as the education level of the target state and political violence. Accordingly, this effect demonstrates that destination states continue to disproportionately favor racially similar states even after accounting for "rational" factors.

In Model (2) and (3) in both tables, I use two other measures of racial difference to account for the hierarchical nature of race. In Model (2), I replace plurality ancestral distance with the dyadic ancestral distance *relative to the United States*. These models suggest that changing the ancestral distance

[16]Summary statistics are found in Appendix table S1.

[17]Appendix table S2 presents the full model results for table 3.

[18]I use the method presented in Cinelli and Hazlett (2020) to conduct sensitivity analyses. The results are in appendix tables S6 and S7, and they provide confidence in the findings.

relative to the United States from one standard deviation below to above the mean is associated with between a 2.3% and a 3% decrease in the probability that the origin state receives a visa waiver. This effect is smaller in magnitude than the previous estimate because the relative distance measure is less ideal for capturing the effect of racial perceptions between countries that are not White. If two countries are ancestrally far from each other (e.g. Japan and Nigeria) but roughly equally distant from the United States, then the relative distance is small. Although Japan should be reticent to grant Nigeria a visa waiver, the relative distance measure will not capture this discrimination.

To address this issue, I use another hierarchical measure of race: an indicator for whether the target is a non-White state in the global South. In these models, I only include destination-year (table 2) or destination (table 3) fixed-effects because the *Origin South* variable is collinear with target fixed-effects. These results suggest that target states in the global South are roughly 9% less likely to receive visa waivers than their counterparts in the global North. These results are consistent with those in Model (1).

In sum, the results show that ancestrally distant states are less likely to receive visa waivers conditional on their other characteristics. This is conditional indirect discrimination in action.

Is this Really Discrimination?

A skeptic may argue that the results above do not show discrimination because they treat all states and dyads equally. In other words, discrimination might only occur if global South states face the strongest penalty or if Western states are the most restrictive. These skeptics also might argue that pre-existing structural inequalities and imperialism preclude non-White states from discriminating, and treating these states as equivalent to Western states does violence to these histories. On the one hand, I disagree with this position: global South states can discriminate too, despite having led the charge against racist migration policies. After independence, many global South states—e.g., Algeria, Cuba, and Suriname—imposed harsh visa regimes for foreigners, particularly those in the global North (Czaika, Haas, and Villares-Varela 2018, 595–596). On the other hand, not all discrimination is equal; discrimination that reproduces long-standing racial inequalities is the most troubling. Ac-

Table 3: Ancestral Distance and Bilateral Visa Waivers, 1974–2013 (Time Cubic Polynomial)

	Visa Waiver		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ancestral Dist.	-0.081^{***}		
	(0.018)		
Ancestral Dist. from USA		-0.023^{**}	
		(0.010)	
Origin South			-0.106^{***}
			(0.014)
Year	0.272^{***}	0.286^{***}	0.238^{***}
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Year^2	-0.009^{***}	-0.010^{***}	-0.009^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Year^3	0.0001^{***}	0.0001^{***}	0.0001^{***}
	(0.00002)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
Target FE	✓	✓	X
Destination FE	✓	✓	✓
N	91,603	91,603	91,603
R^2	0.486	0.483	0.444
Adjusted R^2	0.484	0.482	0.443
Residual Std. Error	0.339 (df = 91325)	0.340 (df = 91325)	0.352 (df = 91449)

$^{*}p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$

cordingly, in line with the corollary of the first hypothesis, I report five additional models that test for more restrictive definitions of discrimination in line in table 4.

Table 4: Discrimination Interaction Models

	Visa Waiver				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ancestral Dist.	-0.013^{***}	-0.036^{***}	-0.032^{***}	-0.028^{***}	-0.028^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Orig. SSA	0.043^{***}				
	(0.004)				
Orig. Low Inc.		0.139^{***}			
		(0.005)			
Orig. Black/Dest. North			-0.081^{***}		
			(0.004)		
Dest. White OECD				-0.123^{***}	
				(0.003)	
Dest. non-White OECD					0.027^{***}
					(0.005)
Anc. Dist. X Orig. SSA	-0.181^{***}				
	(0.007)				
Anc. Dist. X Orig. LI		-0.028^{***}			
		(0.009)			
Anc. Dist. X O. Black/D. North			-0.089^{***}		
			(0.010)		
Anc. Dist. X D. White OECD				-0.062^{***}	
				(0.006)	
Anc. Dist. X D. non-White OECD					0.027^{***}
					(0.008)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Target FE	X	X	✓	✓	✓
Destination FE	✓	✓	X	X	X
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	111,254	111,254	285,011	238,881	238,881
R^2	0.447	0.447	0.285	0.287	0.283
Adjusted R^2	0.446	0.446	0.270	0.269	0.265
Residual Std. Error	0.343 (df = 111061)	0.343 (df = 111061)	0.389 (df = 279189)	0.399 (df = 233123)	0.400 (df = 233123)

$^{*}p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$

In the first three models of table 4, I interact the ancestral distance measure with an indicator for whether: 1) the target state is in sub-Saharan Africa or 2) a World Bank low-income state and 3) whether the destination is in the OECD *and* the target is a non-White, global South state. The results suggest that the nationals of predominantly non-White states in sub-Saharan Africa and other low-income countries face a harsher "penalty" of being more racially distant.[19] I also find support for the claim that OECD states impose harsher restrictions on more racially distant states. Taken together, these results provide additional evidence for a more specific definition of discrimination. Not only are states at a greater ancestral distance less likely to grant visa waivers, OECD states show the strongest likelihood of exhibiting this behavior, and the poorer, non-White states of the global South bear the brunt of these effects. These results are robust to models with a time cubic polynomial (see, appendix table S5).

[19]Appendix table S4 presents the full model results.



Figure 4: White OECD countries discriminate against countries in the global South while non-White OECD countries do not.

However, the OECD is not a monolith. While its original members were the White states of the Anglo-European core (i.e., the United States), the OECD has expanded to include several states that are raced as "non-White" (i.e., Mexico). To further show that the White states of the global North discriminate against the South, I separate OECD states into White and non-White states. I then run two models: one that includes the White OECD states and one that includes the non-White ones. These models include the same dyadic and destination-state covariates as in the previous models, as well as fixed-effects for origin-year. The results are in Models (4) and (5) in table 4 and in figure 4. Both non-White and White OECD destination states impose harsher restrictions on global North states that are more racially distant. While this discrimination intensifies when White OECD states consider states in the global South—corroborating the discrimination revealed above—non-White OECD states *do not* exhibit the same discrimination. The marginal effect of ancestral distance on visa waiver probability is statistically indistinguishable from zero for non-White OECD destination states and global South origins, which further reveals that the global color line persists and depends more on race than on class.

Effects over Time

Finally, I investigate how the relationship between ancestral distance and the likelihood of receiving a visa waiver has changed. This analysis tests the third hypothesis: the relationship between ancestral distance and visa waivers should strengthen over time, particularly since the beginning of the 21st century. There should be no relationship between ancestral distance and visa waivers in the early part of the sample because visas were required of all travelers. Beginning in the 1990s, an association should emerge, as traditional immigrant-receiving states received increased in-flows from non-White migrants and European states shifted to using visa policies to regulate international mobility, both of which were reinforced by the securitization of non-White migrants after 9/11.

To test this hypothesis, I re-estimate a version of Model (1) in table 2. I regress a binary indicator of whether a given destination state grants a target state a visa waiver on the same controls, but I also interact ancestral distance with year dummy variables. This method allows one to use the full time-

series data to trace changes in the effect of ancestral distance over the entire time period. Figure 5 plots the estimated effect of ancestral distance above the baseline effects for each year in the data-set.

All in all, this pattern provides sanguine evidence for the third hypothesis. Figure 5 shows an ambiguous relationship between ancestral distance and visa waivers during the 1970s and 1980s and a gradual decrease in discrimination from 1989 through the mid-1990s. While the former is consistent with theoretical expectations, the latter is more surprising. One may attribute this trend to the post-decolonization push for legal equality, the further entrenchment of Cold War blocs, or the fact that European states used visa policies to signal good faith toward friendly states during this period. Racially different countries were more likely to get visas in some years, conditional on other factors, because they were disproportionately affected by the removal of other racist migration policies, the end of the Cold War, and other European foreign policy objectives. Austria's 1993 agreement with Venezuela is an example of a state granting a waiver due to foreign policy considerations.

Regardless, this pattern quickly flipped in the late-1990s. The mid-1990s inflection point coincides with the Schengen agreements that harmonized EU visa policy and led states to terminate many visa waivers, such as Finland's agreements with Eritrea, Uganda, and Zambia (Mau et al. 2012, 68). But most notably, a strong penalty emerged for racially different immigrants after 2001. This pattern of discrimination solidified in recent years and has become more entrenched after the Great Recession in 2008. In short, as society moves father away from the period during which states removed their racist quotas, the racial global mobility divide intensifies. This trend accelerated post-9/11 as Western states increasingly securitized migrants and other "undesirable" travelers (Bourbeau 2011; Salter 2008). The putatively neutral regulation of undesirability is one way racial inequality continues to hide in plain sight in the international system.

Conclusion

Does racial discrimination persist in international mobility? Despite leaders' claims that their policies that govern migration, bordering, and citizenship are now color-blind, scholars continue to contend that racial inequalities remain. Investigating the existence or extent of these global inequalities



Figure 5: Racial discrimination has strengthened during the 21st century.

promises important insights for our understanding of migration processes in the modern era. Unfortunately, key inferential hurdles prevent scholars from answering this question in a cross-national setting.

In this article, I contribute to this effort in several ways. First, I theorize the distinction between conditional and unconditional indirect discrimination in global mobility rights. Unconditional indirect discrimination occurs when the burden of a policy falls disproportionately on protected groups. Most extant claims about discrimination in migration policies are unconditional, but they succumb to counterarguments that policies are not really discriminatory because some reasonable mitigating factor explains the disparity. Conditional discrimination refers to patterns of inequality that persist after controlling for these mitigating factors, and therefore provides a more tractable path forward for the study of racial discrimination.

Second, I provide evidence of conditional racial discrimination in global mobility rights. To do so, I rely on Locke (1924) 's ontology of race to operationalize the cross-national study of racial difference. As I state above, I do not claim to reveal that states directly discriminate based on race or racial difference. Intentionality is virtually impossible to infer. Rather, I show that states indirectly discriminate against racial outsiders after conditioning on their observable characteristics such as education level. This evidence is more plausible than unconditional analyses that show raw differences in visa waivers between the global North and South because it explicitly accounts for rational policy-making desiderata. Bringing the concept of conditional indirect discrimination to migration studies and IR opens further opportunities to examine other inequalities.

Third, I use a new data-set on bilateral visa waivers to draw these inferences. As I note above, visa waivers provide the ideal case for inferring discrimination in global mobility because they are directed toward specific states. In the past, states explicitly discriminated based on race or nationality, but this type of direct targeting vanished after color-blind policies emerged. Nevertheless, visa waivers target specific states, which reveals how every state in the international system perceives every other state. Actions reveal preferences and perceptions, which lie at the heart of notions of discrimination.

This analysis corroborates extant claims that the liberal international order retains a White supremacist

structure (Búzás 2021; Gruffydd Jones 2008), but studying race racial discrimination in global mobility rights is difficult for many reasons. For one, races neither exist as a biological or scientific fact, nor do they have similar meanings across national boundaries. Any study of race either within or between states risks reifying a concept that causes immense suffering. Even when one studies race with this ethical issue in mind, it is still difficult to study in a global context because racial categories are not consistent across countries. However, the persistent right-wing flaying of critical race theory makes revealing global racial inequality a vital issue in IR. And this evidence should reinforce for scholars and policymakers that the best laid intentions to remove racial discrimination from foreign policy and international politics remain unfulfilled. As others have shown in the American political context (Bonilla-Silva 2006), merely making laws "color-blind" is insufficient to mitigate or reverse centuries of racial inequality. IR has made great strides toward revealing these unsavory dimensions of the international system and future work should prioritize amassing more evidence on this score.

References

Bader, Veit. 2005. "The Ethics of Immigration." *Constellations* 12 (3): 331–361.

Bamshad, Michael, Stephen Wooding, Benjamin A. Salisbury, and J. Claiborne Stephens. 2004. "Deconstructing the Relationship Between Genetics and Race." *Nature Reviews Genetics* 5 (8): 598.

Barder, Alexander D. 2021. *Global Race War: International Politics and Racial Hierarchy.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Barro, Robert J., and Jong-Wha Lee. 2013. "A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World, 1950-2010." *Journal of Development Economics* 104 (2013): 184–198.

Bearce, David H., and Andrew F. Hart. 2017. "International Labor Mobility and the Variety of Democratic Political Institutions." *International Organization* 71 (1): 65–95.

Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 2006. *Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States.* New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Boucher, Anna Katherine. 2020. "How 'Skill' Definition Affects the Diversity of Skilled Immigration Policies." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 46 (12): 2533–2550.

Bourbeau, Philippe. 2011. *The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order.* New York: Routledge.

Búzás, Zoltán I. 2021. "Racism and Antiracism in the Liberal International Order." *International Organization* 75 (2): 1–24.

Campbell, David. 1992. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Carter, David B., and Paul Poast. 2020. "Barriers to Trade: How Border Walls Affect Trade Relations." *International Organization* 74 (1): 165–185.

Carter, David B., and Curtis S. Signorino. 2010. "Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data." *Political Analysis* 18 (3): 271–292.

Chung, Erin Aeran. 2020. "Creating Hierarchies of Noncitizens: Race, Gender, and Visa Categories in South Korea." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 46 (12): 2497–2514.

Cinelli, Carlos, and Chad Hazlett. 2020. "Making Sense of Sensitivity: Extending Omitted Variable Bias." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical Methodology)* 82 (1): 39–67.

Cogley, Nathaniel Terence, John Andrew Doces, and Beth Elise Whitaker. 2018. "Which Immigrants Should Be Naturalized? Which Should Be Deported? Evidence From a Survey Experiment in Côte D'ivoire." *Political Research Quarterly* 72 (3): 653–668.

Coleman, Mathew, and Austin Kocher. 2011. "Detention, Deportation, Devolution and Immigrant Incapacitation in the U.S., post 9/11." *The Geographical Journal* 177 (3): 228–237.

Collins, Hugh, and Tarunabh Khaitan. 2018. "Indirect Discrimination Law: Controversies and Critical Questions." In *Foundations of Indirect Discrimination Law,* edited by Hugh Collins and Tarunabh Khaitan, 1–30. Portland, OR: Hart Publishing.

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, and Jan Teorell. 2019. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, *Varieties of Democracy: Codebook v9.*

Cornell, Stephen, and Douglas Hartmann. 2006. *Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World.* New York: Sage Publications.

Czaika, Mathias, Hein de Haas, and María Villares-Varela. 2018. "The Global Evolution of Travel Visa Regimes." *Population and Development Review* 44 (3): 589.

DEMIG. 2020. *DEMIG VISA, Online Edition.* Oxford: International Migration Institute, University of Oxford.

Dernbach, Andrea, and Paul Starzmann. 2018. "What's in the new German immigration law?" Euractiv. [Online; posted 08-October-2018]. https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/was-steht-im-neuen-einwanderungsgesetz.

Disdier, Anne-Célia, and Thierry Mayer. 2007. "Je t'aime, moi non plus: Bilateral opinions and International Trade." *European Journal of Political Economy* 23 (4): 1140–1159.

Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 1996. "Immigration and National Identity: Constructing the Nation." *Review of International Studies* 22 (3): 235–255.

Ellermann, Antje, and Agustín Goenaga. 2019. "Discrimination and Policies of Immigrant Selection in Liberal States." *Politics & Society* 47 (1): 87–116.

FitzGerald, David, and David David Cook-Martín. 2014. *Culling the Masses.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

FitzGerald, David S, David Cook-Martín, Angela S García, and Rawan Arar. 2018. "Can you become one of us? A historical comparison of legal selection of 'assimilable' immigrants in Europe and the Americas." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44 (1): 27–47.

Gowa, Joanne. 1994. *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gowa, Joanne, and Raymond Hicks. 2013. "Politics, Institutions, and Trade: Lessons of the Interwar Era." *International Organization* 67 (3): 439–467.

Gruffydd Jones, Branwen. 2008. "Race in the Ontology of International Order." *Political Studies* 56 (4): 907–927.

Guiraudon, Virginie. 2003. "Before the EU Border: Remote Control of the "Huddled Masses"." In *In Search of Europe's Borders,* edited by Kees Groenendijk, Elspeth Guild, and Paul Minderhoud, 191–214. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.

Guiraudon, Virginie, and Gallya Lahav. 2000. "A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate: The Case of Migration Control." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (2): 163–195.

Haas, Hein de, Katharina Natter, and Simona Vezzoli. 2018. "Growing Restrictiveness Or Changing Selection? the Nature and Evolution of Migration Policies1." *International Migration Review* 52 (2): 324–367.

Hainmueller, Jens, and Dominik Hangartner. 2013. "Who Gets a Swiss Passport? a Natural Experiment in Immigrant Discrimination." *American Political Science Review* 107 (1): 159–187.

Hainmueller, Jens, and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2015. "The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes Toward Immigrants." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (3): 529–548.

Hayter, Teresa. 2000. *Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls.* London: Pluto Press.

Henderson, Errol A. 2017. "The Revolution will not be Theorised: Du Bois, Locke, and the Howard School's Challenge to White Supremacist IR Theory." *Millennium—Journal of International Studies* 45 (3): 492–510.

Hogan, Jackie, and Kristin Haltinner. 2015. "Floods, Invaders, and Parasites: Immigration Threat Narratives and Right-Wing Populism in the USA, UK and Australia." *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 36 (5): 520–543.

Hollifield, James F. 2004. "The Emerging Migration State." *International Migration Review* 38 (3): 885–912.

Joppke, Christian. 2005. *Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Kymlicka, Will, and Keith Banting. 2006. "Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State." *Ethics & International Affairs* 20 (3): 281–304.

Locke, Alain L. 1924. "The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture." In *The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond,* edited by Leonard Harris, 187–199. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Martin, David A. 1989. "Effects of International Law on Migration Policy and Practice: The Uses of Hypocrisy." *International Migration Review* 23 (3): 547–578.

Martin, S., and E. Ferris. 2017. "Border Security, Migration Governance, and Sovereignty." In *Ideas to Inform International Cooperation on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.* Geneva, CH: IOM.

Mau, Steffen, Heike Brabandt, Lena Laube, and Christof Roos. 2012. *Liberal States and the Freedom of Movement: Selective Borders, Unequal Mobility.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mau, Steffen, Fabian Gülzau, Lena Laube, and Natascha Zaun. 2015. "The Global Mobility Divide: How Visa Policies Have Evolved Over Time." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41 (8): 1192–1213.

Mitzen, Jennifer. 2006. "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma." *European Journal of International Relations* 12 (3): 341–370.

———. 2018. "Feeling At Home in Europe: Migration, Ontological Security, and the Political Psychology of Eu Bordering." *Political Psychology* 39 (6): 1373–1387.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 2019. "Global Terrorism Database (GTD)." University of Maryland. [Online. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

Neumayer, Eric. 2006. "Unequal Access to Foreign Spaces: How States Use Visa Restrictions to Regulate Mobility in a Globalized World." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 31 (1): 72–84.

Peters, Margaret E. 2017. *Trading Barriers: Immigration and the Remaking of Globalization.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Provenzano, Davide. 2020. "The Migration–Tourism Nexus in the EU28." *Tourism Economics* 26 (8): 1374–1393.

Rosenberg, Andrew S. 2019. "Measuring Racial Bias in International Migration Flows." *International Studies Quarterly* 63 (4): 837–845.

Rudolph, Christopher. 2003. "Security and the Political Economy of International Migration." *American Political Science Review* 97 (4): 603–620.

Salter, Mark B. 2008. "Securitization and Desecuritization: a Dramaturgical Analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority." *Journal of International Relations and Development* 11 (4): 321–349.

Sassen, Saskia. 1996. *Losing Control?: Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Satzewich, Vic. 2014. "Visa Officers as Gatekeepers of a State's Borders: The Social Determinants of Discretion in Spousal Sponsorship Cases in Canada." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40 (9): 1450–1469.

Seetaram, Neelu. 2012. "Immigration and International Inbound Tourism: Empirical Evidence From Australia." *Tourism Management* 33 (6): 1535–1543.

Shachar, Ayelet. 2018. "The Marketization of Citizenship in an Age of Restrictionism." *Ethics & International Affairs* 32 (1): 3–13.

Shilliam, Robbie. 2018. *Race and the Undeserving Poor.* Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Agenda Publishing.

Spolaore, Enrico, and Romain Wacziarg. 2009. "The Diffusion of Development." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124 (2): 469–529.

———. 2018. "Ancestry and Development: New Evidence." *Journal of Applied Econometrics* 33 (5): 748–762.

The World Bank. 2021. *International tourism, receipts (% of total exports).* Data retrieved from Yearbook of Tourism Statistics, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ST.INT.RCPT.XP.ZS.

———. 2022. *International Tourism, Number of Arrivals.* Data retrieved from World Development Indicators, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ST.INT.ARVL.

Torpey, John. 1998. "Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate "Means of Movement"." *Sociological Theory* 16 (3): 239–259.

Triadafilopoulos, Triadafilos. 2010. "Global Norms, Domestic Institutions and the Transformation of Immigration Policy in Canada and the US." *Review of International Studies* 36 (1): 169–193.

Trump, Donald J. 2020. "Remarks by President Trump in Press Briefing." The White House. [Online; posted 13-August-2020]. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-briefing-august-13-2020/.

Valdez, Inés. 2016. "Punishment, Race, and the Organization of U.S. Immigration Exclusion." *Political Research Quarterly* 69 (4): 640–654.

Westreich, Daniel, and Sander Greenland. 2013. "The Table 2 Fallacy: Presenting and Interpreting Confounder and Modifier Coefficients." *American Journal of Epidemiology* 177 (4): 292–298.

Williams, Allan M., and C. Michael Hall. 2002. "Tourism, Migration, Circulation and Mobility." In *Tourism and Migration,* edited by Allan M. Williams and C. Michael Hall, 1–52. Dordrecht: Springer.

Yousuf, Shereen, and Bernadette Calafell. 2018. "The Imperative for Examining anti-Muslim Racism in Rhetorical Studies." *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 15 (4): 312–318.

Ypi, Lea. 2008. "Justice in Migration: A Closed Borders Utopia?" *Journal of Political Philosophy* 16 (4): 391–418.

Online Appendix

Summary of Data

Table S1: Summary statistics of regression variables. Logarithmic transformations are included. Values are rounded to the nearest hundredth.

Variable	n	mean	sd	max	min
Ancestral Distance	448274	-0.05	0.51	1.61	-0.83
Inequality	447403	1.15	0.14	1.83	1.00
Origin Lib. Dem.	442647	0.35	0.28	0.89	0.01
Origin Violence	448274	0.60	0.32	0.99	0.01
Origin Ed.	388438	6.53	3.34	13.55	0.14
Log Trade	285280	14.88	3.97	26.60	0.00
Colonial Relationship	444575	0.02	0.12	1.00	0.00
Alliance	448274	0.08	0.27	1.00	0.00
Origin Terrorist Attack	448274	0.48	0.50	1.00	0.00
Origin Log Tourist Exports	158537	2.28	0.92	4.31	0.01
Origin Civil Liberties	448274	0.62	0.28	0.97	0.01
Common Religion	448274	0.18	0.26	1.00	0.00
Common Language	448274	0.17	0.37	1.00	0.00
Same Region	448274	0.25	0.43	1.00	0.00
Same Income	448274	0.27	0.45	1.00	0.00
Origin Exit Restrict	448274	0.22	0.41	1.00	0.00
Dest. Violence	448274	0.58	0.32	0.99	0.01
Dest. Ed.	366631	6.53	3.36	13.61	0.14
Dest. Civil Liberties	448274	0.58	0.30	0.97	0.01
Dest. Lib. Dem.	446331	0.34	0.29	0.89	0.01

Full Regression Models

Table S2: Ancestral Distance and Bilateral Visa Waivers, 1974–2013 (Time Cubic Polynomial)

	Visa Waiver		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ancestral Dist.	-0.081^{***}		
	(0.018)		
Ancestral Dist. from USA		-0.023^{**}	
		(0.010)	
Origin South			-0.106^{***}
			(0.014)
Common Lang.	0.131^{***}	0.140^{***}	0.138^{***}
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Common Religion	0.094^{***}	0.093^{***}	0.093^{***}
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Inequality	-0.185^{***}	-0.199^{***}	-0.140^{***}
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Same Region	0.0002	0.025	0.063^{***}
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Same Income	0.067^{***}	0.063^{***}	0.088^{***}
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Log Trade	0.161^{***}	0.170^{***}	0.145^{***}
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Colonial Relationship	-0.106^{**}	-0.103^{**}	-0.111^{**}
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.052)
Alliance	0.165^{***}	0.159^{***}	0.172^{***}
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Physical Violence Origin	-0.016	-0.020	0.068^{**}
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.030)
Education Origin	-0.069	-0.068	-0.043^{**}
	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.018)
Terrorist Attack Origin	-0.009^{***}	-0.009^{***}	-0.043^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Log Tourism/Exports	0.017	0.017	-0.016^{*}
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)
Civil Liberties Origin	-0.005	-0.002	-0.040
	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.041)
Lib. Democracy Origin	0.021	0.021	0.200^{***}
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.023)
Exit Restrict. Origin	0.017	0.016	0.012
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Civil Liberties Dest	0.0001	0.001	0.014
	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.072)
Education Dest.	0.001	0.002	0.006
	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.103)
Physical Violence Dest.	0.042	0.041	0.026
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Lib. Democracy Dest	-0.043	-0.041	-0.031
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Year	0.272^{***}	0.286^{***}	0.238^{***}
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Year^2	-0.009^{***}	-0.010^{***}	-0.009^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Year^3	0.0001^{***}	0.0001^{***}	0.0001^{***}
	(0.00002)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)
Target FE	✓	✓	X
Destination FE	✓	✓	✓
N	91,603	91,603	91,603
R^2	0.486	0.483	0.444
Adjusted R^2	0.484	0.482	0.443
Residual Std. Error	0.339 (df = 91325)	0.340 (df = 91325)	0.352 (df = 91449)

$^{*}p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$

Table S3: Effect of Racial Difference with Origin-Year and Destination-Year Fixed Effects

	Visa Waiver		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ancestral Dist.	-0.081^{***}		
	(0.014)		
Ancestral Dist. from USA		-0.035^{***}	
		(0.008)	
Origin South			-0.128^{***}
			(0.007)
Common Lang.	0.132^{***}	0.139^{***}	0.134^{***}
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Common Religion	0.100^{***}	0.099^{***}	0.098^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Inequality	-0.155^{***}	-0.162^{***}	-0.098^{***}
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Same Region	0.035^{***}	0.054^{***}	0.070^{***}
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Same Income	0.028^{***}	0.025^{***}	0.076^{***}
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Log Trade	0.122^{***}	0.129^{***}	0.155^{***}
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Colonial Relationship	-0.015	-0.013	-0.019
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.031)
Alliance	0.119^{***}	0.115^{***}	0.148^{***}
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Target-Year FE	✓	✓	X
Destination-Year FE	✓	✓	✓
N	284,876	284,876	284,876
R^2	0.520	0.518	0.436
Adjusted R^2	0.500	0.498	0.424
Residual Std. Error	0.322 (df = 273399)	0.323 (df = 273399)	0.346 (df = 279134)

$^{*}p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$

Table S4: Full Discrimination Interaction Models

	Visa Waiver				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ancestral Dist.	-0.013^{***}	-0.036^{***}	-0.032^{***}	-0.016^{***}	-0.020^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Orig. SSA.	0.043^{***}				
	(0.004)				
Orig. Low Income		0.139^{***}			
		(0.005)			
Orig. South/Dest. North			-0.081^{***}		
			(0.004)		
Dest. White OECD				-0.081^{***}	
				(0.004)	
Dest. non-White OECD					0.027^{***}
					(0.004)
Common Lang.	0.091^{***}	0.104^{***}	0.121^{***}	0.147^{***}	0.151^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Common Religion	0.089^{***}	0.082^{***}	0.071^{***}	0.074^{***}	0.070^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Inequality	-0.085^{***}	-0.119^{***}	-0.102^{***}	-0.142^{***}	-0.155^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Same Region	0.067^{***}	0.070^{***}	0.035^{***}	0.040^{***}	0.050^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Same Income	0.100^{***}	0.088^{***}	0.074^{***}	0.044^{***}	0.052^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Log Trade	0.133^{***}	0.139^{***}	0.206^{***}	0.135^{***}	0.128^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Colonial Relationship	-0.096^{***}	-0.100^{***}	-0.005	-0.016^{***}	-0.022^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Alliance	0.166^{***}	0.164^{***}	0.092^{***}	0.064^{***}	0.067^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Physical Violence Origin	0.108^{***}	0.104^{***}			
	(0.008)	(0.008)			
Education Origin	0.066^{***}	0.080^{***}			
	(0.004)	(0.003)			
Terrorist Attack Origin	-0.034^{***}	-0.033^{***}			
	(0.002)	(0.002)			
Log Tourism/Exports	-0.012^{***}	-0.011^{***}			
	(0.002)	(0.002)			
Civil Liberties Origin	-0.095^{***}	-0.061^{***}			
	(0.011)	(0.011)			
Lib. Democracy Origin	0.187^{***}	0.166^{***}			
	(0.006)	(0.006)			
Exit Restrict. Origin	-0.0004	0.003			
	(0.003)	(0.003)			
Civil Liberties Dest				-0.032^{***}	-0.035^{***}
				(0.005)	(0.005)
Education Dest.				0.039^{***}	0.023^{***}
				(0.003)	(0.003)
Physical Violence Dest.				0.114^{***}	0.128^{***}
				(0.006)	(0.006)
Lib. Democracy Dest				0.059^{***}	0.035^{***}
				(0.004)	(0.004)
Anc. Dist. X Origin SSA	-0.181^{***}				
	(0.007)				
Anc. Dist. X Origin Low Inc.		-0.028^{***}			
		(0.009)			
Anc. Dist. X O. South/D. North			-0.089^{***}		
			(0.010)		
Anc. Dist. X D. White OECD				-0.062^{***}	
				(0.006)	
Anc. Dist. X D. non-White OECD					0.027^{***}
					(0.008)
Target FE	X	X	✓	✓	✓
Destination FE	✓	✓	X	X	X
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	111,254	111,254	285,011	238,881	238,881
R^2	0.447	0.447	0.285	0.308	0.306
Adjusted R^2	0.446	0.446	0.270	0.291	0.289
Residual Std. Error	0.343 (df = 111061)	0.343 (df = 111061)	0.389 (df = 279189)	0.393 (df = 233119)	0.394 (df = 233119)

$^{*}p < .1$; $^{**}p < .05$; $^{***}p < .01$

Table S5: Discrimination Interaction Models (Cubic Polynomial)

			Visa Waiver		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ancestral Dist.	-0.013^{***}	-0.038^{***}	-0.035^{***}	-0.020^{***}	-0.025^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Orig. SSA.	0.050^{***}				
	(0.004)				
Orig. Low Income		0.156^{***}			
		(0.006)			
Orig. South/Dest. North			-0.071^{***}		
			(0.004)		
Dest. White OECD				-0.077^{***}	
				(0.004)	
Dest. non-White OECD					0.030^{***}
					(0.004)
Common Lang.	0.108^{***}	0.123^{***}	0.121^{***}	0.146^{***}	0.150^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Common Religion	0.089^{***}	0.082^{***}	0.071^{***}	0.073^{***}	0.069^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Inequality	-0.107^{***}	-0.144^{***}	-0.098^{***}	-0.135^{***}	-0.147^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Same Region	0.042^{***}	0.046^{***}	0.045^{***}	0.049^{***}	0.058^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Same Income	0.101^{***}	0.089^{***}	0.074^{***}	0.047^{***}	0.054^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Log Trade	0.142^{***}	0.151^{***}	0.207^{***}	0.140^{***}	0.133^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Colonial Relationship	-0.111^{***}	-0.114^{***}	-0.003	-0.014^{**}	-0.020^{***}
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Alliance	0.177^{***}	0.172^{***}	0.087^{***}	0.063^{***}	0.065^{***}
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Physical Violence Origin	0.121^{***}	0.116^{***}			
	(0.009)	(0.009)			
Education Origin	0.069^{***}	0.084^{***}			
	(0.004)	(0.004)			
Terrorist Attack Origin	-0.038^{***}	-0.037^{***}			
	(0.003)	(0.003)			
Log Tourism/Exports	-0.009^{***}	-0.009^{***}			
	(0.003)	(0.003)			
Civil Lib. Origin	-0.102^{***}	-0.060^{***}			
	(0.012)	(0.012)			
Lib. Dem. Origin	0.192^{***}	0.167^{***}			
	(0.006)	(0.006)			
Exit Restrict. Origin	0.005	0.008^{**}			
	(0.004)	(0.004)			
Physical Violence Dest.	0.025	0.028		-0.031^{***}	-0.034^{***}
	(0.029)	(0.029)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Education Dest.	0.006	0.019		0.037^{***}	0.022^{***}
	(0.048)	(0.048)		(0.003)	(0.003)
Civil Liberties Dest	0.020	0.017		0.120^{***}	0.134^{***}
	(0.045)	(0.044)		(0.006)	(0.006)
Lib. Dem. Dest	-0.036^{*}	-0.035^{*}		0.049^{***}	0.026^{***}
	(0.020)	(0.020)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Year	0.224^{***}	0.240^{***}	0.0003	0.004^{***}	0.005^{***}
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Year^2	-0.008^{***}	-0.009^{***}	-0.0002^{***}	-0.001^{***}	-0.001^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.00004)	(0.00005)	(0.00005)
Year^3	0.0001^{***}	0.0001^{***}	0.00000^{***}	0.00001^{***}	0.00001^{***}
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Anc. Dist. X Origin SSA	-0.186^{***}				
	(0.008)				
Anc. Dist. X Origin Low Inc.		-0.018^{*}			
		(0.010)			
Anc. Dist. X O. South/D. North			-0.103^{***}		
			(0.010)		
Anc. Dist. X D. White OECD				-0.065^{***}	
				(0.006)	
Anc. Dist. X D. non-White OECD					0.027^{***}
					(0.008)
Target FE	X	X	✓	✓	✓
Destination FE	✓	✓	X	X	X
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	91,603	91,603	285,011	238,881	238,881
R^2	0.446	0.446	0.255	0.277	0.275
Adjusted R^2	0.445	0.445	0.255	0.276	0.275
Residual Std. Error	0.352 (df = 91447)	0.352 (df = 91447)	0.393 (df = 284836)	0.397 (df = 238703)	0.398 (df = 238703)

*p $<$ .1; **p $<$ .05; ***p $<$ .01

Sensitivity Analysis

In the analysis above, I rely on the assumption of no unmeasured confounders to make causal claims from observational data. In this appendix, I conduct a sensitivity analysis to show what one must be prepared to believe to sustain that the results above are not due to confounding. The strength of sensitivity analyses is that they allow one to quantitatively present the fragility of supposedly causal inferences. I apply the approach developed by Cinelli and Hazlett (2020), which estimates how strong an omitted variable must be to change the conclusions found in tables 2 and 3.

I present the results in tables S6 and S7. These tables present the parameter estimates, standard errors, and t-values for each of the models in tables 2 and 3. In addition, they include the partial R^2 of the racial distance variables with the visa waiver variable, the robustness value (RV) required to reduce each estimate to 0 ($RV_{q=1}$), and the RV beyond which the estimate would no longer be statistically distinguishable from zero at the 0.05 level ($q = 1$, $\alpha = 0.05$). In each table, I also present the same values for the *Alliance* variable, because whether two states are in an alliance is strongly related both to their racial distance and whether the destination grants the target a visa waiver.

All of the results provide confidence in the reported estimates. For example, the first row in table S7 show that an observed confounder would need to be more than five times as strongly associated with the ancestral distance variable as the alliance variable. Likewise, the other rows estimate that an observed confounder would need to be roughly twice and six times as strongly associated with the ancestral distance from the USA and origin south treatments, respectively. The results in table S6 are even stronger.

Table S6: Sensitivity Analyses for Table 2

Outcome: *Visa Waiver*

Treatment:	Est.	S.E.	t-value	$R^2_{Y\sim D\|\mathbf{X}}$	$RV_{q=1}$	$RV_{q=1,\alpha=0.05}$
Ancestral Distance	-0.087	0.003	-25.518	0.6%	7.5%	6.9%
Ancestral Distance from USA	-0.031	0.002	-12.936	0.2%	3.9%	3.3%
Origin South	-0.089	0.004	-25.419	0.6%	7.4%	6.9%

Ancestral Distance Bound (1x Alliance): $R^2_{Y\sim Z|\mathbf{X},D}$ = 1.3%, $R^2_{D\sim Z|\mathbf{X}}$ = 0.3%

Ancestral Distance from USA Bound (1x Alliance): $R^2_{Y\sim Z|\mathbf{X},D}$ = 1.2%, $R^2_{D\sim Z|\mathbf{X}}$ = 0%

Origin South Bound (1x Alliance): $R^2_{Y\sim Z|\mathbf{X},D}$ = 1.4%, $R^2_{D\sim Z|\mathbf{X}}$ = 0.1%

Table S7: Sensitivity Analyses for Table 3

Outcome: *Visa Waiver*

Treatment:	Est.	S.E.	t-value	$R^2_{Y\sim D\|\mathbf{X}}$	$RV_{q=1}$	$RV_{q=1,\alpha=0.05}$
Ancestral Distance	-0.081	0.004	-21.788	0.5%	7%	6.3%
Ancestral Distance from USA	-0.023	0.003	-8.631	0.1%	2.8%	2.2%
Origin South	-0.106	0.004	-26.221	0.7%	8.3%	7.7%

Ancestral Distance Bound (1x Alliance): $R^2_{Y\sim Z|\mathbf{X},D}$ = 1.3%, $R^2_{D\sim Z|\mathbf{X}}$ = 0.4%

Ancestral Distance from USA Bound (1x Alliance): $R^2_{Y\sim Z|\mathbf{X},D}$ = 1.2%, $R^2_{D\sim Z|\mathbf{X}}$ = 0%

Origin South Bound (1x Alliance): $R^2_{Y\sim Z|\mathbf{X},D}$ = 1.4%, $R^2_{D\sim Z|\mathbf{X}}$ = 0.1%

Logistic Regressions

Table S8: Logistic Regression models of Bilateral Visa Waivers

	Visa Waiver		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ancestral Dist.	-0.606^{***}		
	(0.035)		
Ancestral Dist. from USA		-0.167^{***}	
		(0.024)	
Origin South			-0.870^{***}
			(0.313)
Common Lang.	1.118^{***}	1.184^{***}	1.183^{***}
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Common Religion	0.842^{***}	0.849^{***}	0.843^{***}
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Inequality	-1.570^{***}	-1.719^{***}	-1.778^{***}
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Same Region	0.191^{***}	0.343^{***}	0.416^{***}
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.030)
Same Income	0.472^{***}	0.442^{***}	0.431^{***}
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Log Trade	1.562^{***}	1.617^{***}	1.622^{***}
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Colonial Relationship	-0.919^{***}	-0.922^{***}	-0.916^{***}
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Alliance	1.223^{***}	1.163^{***}	1.149^{***}
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Physical Violence Origin	-0.830^{***}	-0.859^{***}	-0.966^{***}
	(0.238)	(0.237)	(0.239)
Education Origin	0.989^{***}	1.035^{***}	0.453
	(0.240)	(0.238)	(0.313)
Terrorist Attack Origin	-0.110^{***}	-0.110^{***}	-0.110^{***}
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Log Tourism/Exports	0.228^{***}	0.227^{***}	0.220^{***}
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Civil Liberties Origin	0.907^{**}	0.904^{**}	1.089^{***}
	(0.398)	(0.396)	(0.398)
Lib. Democracy Origin	0.462^{**}	0.487^{**}	0.447^{**}
	(0.204)	(0.203)	(0.202)
Exit Restric. Origin	0.140^{*}	0.136^{*}	0.135^{*}
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
(Intercept)	-2.748^{***}	-2.728^{***}	-2.207^{***}
	(0.262)	(0.261)	(0.326)
Origin RE	✓	✓	✓
Destination RE	✓	✓	✓
Year RE	✓	✓	✓
N	111,254	111,254	111,254
Log Likelihood	-34,252.620	-34,378.990	-34,399.430
AIC	68,545.250	68,797.970	68,838.850
BIC	68,737.640	68,990.360	69,031.240

*p $<$ .1; **p $<$ .05; ***p $<$ .01