Andrew S. Rosenberg, "Measuring Racial Bias in International Migration Flows." International Studies Quarterly. Forthcoming.
Abstract: Are international migration flows racially biased? Despite widespread consensus that racism and xenophobia affect migration processes, no measure exists to provide systematic evidence on this score. In this short paper, I construct such a measure—the migration deviation. Migration deviations are the difference between the observed migration between states, and the ﬂow that we would predict based on a racially blind model that includes a wide variety of political and economic factors. Using this measure, I conduct a descriptive analysis and provide evidence that migrants from majority black states migrate far less than we would expect under a racially blind model. These results pave a new way for scholars to study international racial inequality.
Andrew S. Rosenberg, Austin J. Knuppe, and Bear F. Braumoeller, "Unifying the Study of Asymmetric Hypotheses" Political Analysis 25(3): 381--401. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2017.16
Abstract: This article presents a conceptual clarification of asymmetric hypotheses and a discussion of methodologies available to test them. Despite the existence of a litany of theories that posit asymmetric causation, most empirical studies fail to capture their core insight: boundaries separating zones of data from areas that lack data are substantively interesting. We discuss existing set-theoretic and large-N approaches to the study of asymmetric hypotheses, evaluate their relative merits, and give three examples of how asymmetric hypotheses can be studied with this suite of tools.
Working Papers (Drafts available upon request)
Jan H. Pierskalla, Adam Lauretig, Andrew S. Rosenberg, and Audrey Sacks, "Democratization and Representative Bureaucracy---An Analysis of Promotion Patterns in Indonesia's Civil Service, 1980-2015.'' Revise and Resubmit at the American Journal of Political Science.
Abstract: Civil service organizations in the developing world are often unrepresentative of the populations they serve. This has important consequences for the quality of public goods provision and the bureaucracy's perceived trustworthiness. We explore the effect of democratization on the discrimination against women and minorities in the civil service. We argue that democratization leads to increased discrimination due to the politicization of identity cleavages. We test our argument using administrative data from Indonesia that covers the universe of career histories of all 4+ million active civil servants. We exploit the exogenous timing of Indonesia's democratization and the staggered introduction of local direct elections for identification purposes. We find strong evidence that democratization worsened the career prospects of female and some religious minority bureaucrats. Penalties are higher for employees of departments led by conservative Muslim parties, in districts with larger Muslim party vote shares, and in the religiously conservative province of Aceh.
William Minozzi, Andrew S. Rosenberg, Eun Bin Chung, and Matthew P. Hitt, "It Takes Two: Heterogeneous Motivations for Reputations in International Relations." Under Review
Abstract: Most scholarship on reputations in IR argues either that states have instrumental motives, or that they cultivate reputations because of intrinsic reasons—or that the two accounts are observationally equivalent. Such equivalence suggests that motivational heterogeneity does not matter. In contrast, we claim that this equivalence results from a failure to identify a missing counterfactual: behavior in a system with limited capacity for reputations. We develop a theoretical minimal reputation environment to explain how actors with different motivations behave within various institutions, and test our predictions using an incentivized experiment based on trust games. Categorizing participants based on “folk realism,” we find that consequence-oriented realists respond dramatically to reputation enhancing institutions, leapfrogging appropriateness-oriented idealists in trust and trustworthiness. Moreover, a leader-follower dynamic emerges, as realists respond quickly to novel institutions and idealists adapt more slowly. Ultimately, we argue that it takes two kinds of motivations to explain reputations in IR.
Andrew S. Rosenberg, "Emigration Underflows and Economic Development." Under Review
Abstract: The conventional wisdom among scholars of international migration is that emigration either harms a sending state's economic growth via a ``brain drain,'' or that it produces incentives for citizens to acquire education and generates a ``brain gain.'' I argue that this debate results from a failure to identify a missing counterfactual: the world in which emigration rates match neoclassical economic expectations. Comparing observed emigration to a counterfactual prediction allows one to infer if a state has more or less emigration than expected. I create a model of this counterfactual and develop a theory of a negative incentive effect to explain why some states suffer a ``drain'' while others experience a ``gain.'' Using a novel dataset, I find that underflows in emigration are associated with less human capital accumulation and decreased economic growth. This result holds strongest for states in the developing world, suggesting an unexplored dimension of international inequality.
Andrew S. Rosenberg, "Causal Probabilities and Forensic Social Science."
Abstract: Social science is a forensic discipline because most phenomena of interest have occurred and the researcher's task is to adjudicate among many causes of these events. However, the debate about the best way to test complex causal relationships is not discerning and falls along familiar quantitative/qualitative lines. To remedy this situation I present two probabilistic causal inference estimators, the probability of necessary and sufficient causation, that provide a unified framework for testing these relationships. I use a novel simulation study to show that these estimators strictly dominate the inferences made with existing large-N and set-theoretic techniques.
Andrew S. Rosenberg, William Minozzi, Elias Assaf, and Christopher Gelpi, "Man, the State, and War: An Experimental Approach."
Abstract: Both scholars and interested observers of international politics share the intuitive sense that “leaders matter” in determining the onset and prevention of war. Much of the international relations literature on this question, however, has struggled to identify systematic causal effects. The difficulty in identifying the causal impact of leaders on the outbreak of war is primarily rooted in two issues: 1) the measurement of individual characteristics at a distance, and 2) the confounding of leadership characteristics with other national and international covariates in observational data. We propose a method for overcoming these problems through the online experimental analysis of crisis bargaining. We construct an online simulacrum for crisis bargaining that captures many of the key features of this literature while avoiding some of the important shortcomings of typical behavioral economics games for the study of war. Game instructions and screen shots of gameplay are included in our appendices. Next, we identify a key individual leadership characteristic - narcissism - and theorize its expected impact on play in our game. We then conduct computer simulations of game play based upon randomized assignment of narcissistic and non-narcissistic leaders to different simulated international systems. Our analysis of the simulated data illustrates the viability of our approach and provides hypotheses for the impact of leadership narcissism at the system level. At the same time, our results also highlight the importance of careful theorizing about causal process when examining treatment effects in a complex and strategic context.
Jan H. Pierskalla, Adam Lauretig, Andrew S. Rosenberg, and Audrey Sacks, "Merit or Patronage?: The Dual Effect of Democratization on Civil Service Management.''
Abstract: Coming Soon.